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ABSTRACT
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, courts have incorporated the efficient capital markets
hypothesis as an analytical tool in securities fraud cases.
Nevertheless, recent turmoil in the financial markets and a growing
chorus of scholarship challenging traditional notions of market
efficiency have caused some courts to reconsider the role of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis in securities fraud litigation.
This Note analyzes a question that has split the circuits and marks
the intersection of market efficiency and securities fraud: how
quickly must an equity security depreciate in price following the
publication of a corrective disclosure for a plaintiff to plead and
prove loss causation? Part I introduces the efficient capital markets
hypothesis, securities fraud actions, and the ways in which courts
have traditionally employed concepts of market efficiency into their
analyses. Part II analyzes the circuit split regarding the speed with
which the market must incorporate information into price for a
plaintiff to properly plead and prove loss causation. Finally, Part III
argues that courts should resist the temptation to draw bright-line
rules in the context of loss causation and should engage each case on
its facts by analyzing the efficiency of the relevant market during
each event giving rise to the fraud and economic loss.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an old joke, widely told among economists,
about an economist strolling down the street with a
companion when they come upon a $100 bill [laying] on
the ground. As the companion reaches down to pick it
up, the economist says “Don’t bother—if it were a real
$100 bill, someone would have already picked it up.”1
This joke is representative of a widely endorsed economic theory—
the efficient capital markets hypothesis (“ECMH”)—taken to its logical
extreme.2 Developed in its contemporary form by the Chicago School
of Economics, the ECMH posits that in “efficient” markets, the prices of
securities accurately reflect all publicly available information.3 Over the
1. ANDREW W. LO & CRAIG MACKINLAY, A NON-RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET § 1.2 (1999).
2. See id.; see also Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding
Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978).
3. This Note found the following sources helpful in navigating the rich and vast
body of scholarship regarding the ECMH. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also
JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND
DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1059 (1987); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38
BUS. LAW. 1 (1982); Jensen, supra note 2.
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course of the last four decades, the ECMH has had a monumental
influence on securities litigation, particularly in the context of Rule 10b5 securities fraud.4 This Note examines a question that has split the
circuits: how quickly must an equity security depreciate in price
following the release of a corrective disclosure for a plaintiff to prove
the element of loss causation? Part I provides a brief explanation of the
ECMH, Rule 10b-5, and the ways in which at least three elements of
Rule 10b-5 have been shaped by judicial endorsement of the ECMH.
Part II examines the circuit split regarding this issue and discusses
recent case law addressing the rapid incorporation of information into
securities prices. Part III takes the position that courts should adopt a
fact-specific rule with respect to loss causation and resist the temptation
to apply any bright-line rule based on the ECMH.
I. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
The contemporary version of the ECMH,5 and the version that has
had the clearest impact on legal analyses in the Rule 10b-5 context,6 was
first articulated by University of Chicago Booth School of Business
economist Eugene F. Fama.7 In his 1970 work entitled Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Fama outlined a
framework of market efficiency in the context of three categories8: weak
4. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1992); see also Jill E. Fisch,
Picking A Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 463 (1995) (reviewing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)).
5. The notion of efficient pricing and efficient markets far predates Fama.
Scholars including Adam Smith, Jules Regnault, Louis Bachelier, and perhaps even
Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle have commented on market price efficiency. See FOX,
supra note 3, at xiii.
6. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 852 n.7.
7. See
Faculty Directory: Eugene F. Fama, CHICAGO BOOTH,
http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/bio.aspx?person_id=12824813568 (last visited
Nov. 11, 2012).
8. Strictly speaking, Fama’s work did not categorize markets but rather relied on
empirical data to define characteristics of a particular market with respect to
information. In terms of methodology, Fama utilized conditional expected returns
described notationally as
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form, semi-strong form, and strong form.9 In weak form markets, prices
of securities10 reflect only historical price data of that security.11
Accordingly, an investor trading in a weak form market who possesses
any information more recent than historical price data with respect to a
security could turn a profit by trading on the basis of the recent
information.12 In semi-strong markets, prices of securities accurately
reflect all publicly available information.13 In a semi-strong form
market, contrary to a weak form market, an investor who possesses
publicly available information would not be able to turn a profit by
trading on the basis of that information because the market would have
already incorporated that information into the prices of securities.14
Finally, in a strong form market, all information—including information
that is available only to groups with “monopolistic access,” such as
corporate insiders and designated market makers—is reflected in the
prices of securities.15 Accordingly, even corporate insiders who seek to
trade on the basis of material non-public information would be unable to
turn a profit because the market would have already priced in such
information.16 Despite Fama’s neatly divided categories of market
efficiency, it is important to realize that the data behind the ECMH

Conditional on relevant information, the expected return (i.e. expected price at time
t+1) is a function of the information available to the market – or risk. The expected
return of the price of security j at time t+1 is a function of the current (at time t) price of
the security and the expected one period percentage return given some set of relevant
information. On a market-wide scale, such prices will approach equilibrium and cancel
out irrational outliers. It is also important to note that Fama listed three characteristics
sufficient, although not necessary, to achieve a (semi-strong form) efficient market.
Such factors include: (1) zero transaction costs associated with trading securities; (2)
freely available information accessible by all market participants; and (3) unanimous
agreement on the part of market participants with respect to the current implications of
information on future prices. See Fama, supra note 3, at 387.
9. See id. at 384.
10. The term “securities” in this Note refers to equity securities, and more
specifically, to common stock. It does not refer to debt securities or convertible
debt/equity hybrid instruments.
11. See Fama, supra note 3, at 388.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 388, 415.
16. See id. at 388.
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predates the ECMH itself, at least in its contemporary form.17 Put
another way, Fama did not suggest that there are three types of markets,
which always behave in accordance with certain abstract economic
principles.18 Rather, Fama argued that there are three general types of
market behavior, which can be seen in any market at any given time.19
Of Fama’s three categories, the semi-strong form is most widely
endorsed by economists,20 traders,21 jurists,22 and securities regulators.23
In fact, less than a decade after Fama’s landmark work, Michael Jensen,
a famous financial economist in his own right, boldly stated that “there
is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical
evidence supporting it than the Efficient [Capital] Market Hypothesis.”24
From Jensen’s comment to the present day, the ECMH “began its
17. See id. at 383 (“Though we proceed from theory to empirical work, to keep the
proper historical perspective we should note to a large extent that the empirical work in
this area preceded the development of the theory.”); see also Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 3, at 552 (“[L]egal users of the ECMH literature have been, by and large,
confronted with a body of empirical evidence in search of a causative theory.”).
18. See Fama, supra note 3, at 387 (“[A] frictionless market in which all
information is freely available and investors agree on its implications is, of course, not
descriptive of markets met in practice.”).
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 2, at 95; Fama, supra note 3, at 383, 387; Eugene
F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 Int’l Econ. Rev.
1 (1969) [hereinafter Fama, Adjustment of Stock Prices], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321524## (“There is an impressive
body of empirical evidence which indicates that successive price changes in individual
common stocks are very nearly independent. [Economic papers and research] show
rigorously that independence of successive price changes is consistent with an
‘efficient’ market, i.e., a market that adjusts rapidly to new information.”).
21. The belief that stock prices reflect all available information at any given time
led, at least in part, to the belief that investors, even professional investors, could not
outperform the market with any consistency. Such belief gave rise to index fundinvestment strategies, which provide investors with an opportunity to invest in funds
that seek merely to simulate, rather than outperform, the market as a whole. See
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE BEST INVESTMENT
ADVICE FOR THE NEW CENTURY (1999).
22. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 851; Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational
Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?: Derivative Securities and Financial Futures
and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 987
(1992); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 549.
23. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 851; Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as
a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy
Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 537–38 (1990).
24. Jensen, supra note 2, at 95; see Langevoort, supra note 4, at 853 n.8.
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remarkable transition from theory to doctrine”25 and embedded itself in
policies underlying securities laws, regulations, and jurisprudence.26 In
1988, after some years in the federal circuit courts,27 the Supreme Court
famously adopted the ECMH in the landmark decision of Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson.28
B. SECTION 10(b) SECURITIES FRAUD
In the midst of the Great Depression, Congress, passed the
Securities Act of 193329 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act” and, together with the
Securities Act, the “Securities Laws”)30 in an effort to prevent future
instances of rampant fraud and manipulation.31 These landmark pieces
of legislation were based on two overarching principles: disclosure of
information and prevention of fraud.32
Following a period of unbridled abuse in the securities markets,
Congress, as a matter of public policy, decided that the best and least
intrusive way33 to ensure market integrity was to provide investors with
25.
26.
27.

Langevoort, supra note 4, at 853.
Id. at 851.
See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986); Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
29. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 111–72, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006).
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 73–85 (1933) (“During the post-war decade some 50 billions
of new securities were floated in the United States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000
worth of securities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless. . . . The
flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made possible because
of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers in securities of those
standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement
of investment in any enterprise.”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 727–28 (1975).
32. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984).
33. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act expressly do not involve merit review
of securities at the federal level. Certain state securities laws and regulations, known
colloquially as “Blue Sky Laws,” do involve the review of the merits and characteristics
of securities by state regulators. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 232
(1988) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court repeatedly has described the ‘fundamental purpose’ of

2012]

THE ECMH AND LOSS CAUSATION

197

information about the various companies whose securities were issued
to, and traded by, the public.34 Accordingly, the Securities Act, which
governs capital formation in the primary market,35 requires companies
that wish to issue securities to the public to file a registration statement36
containing detailed information about both the securities and the
company at large with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC”). This registration statement is in turn made
available to the public.37 Similarly, the Exchange Act, which governs,
inter alia, securities that trade in secondary markets,38 requires reporting
the [Securities Laws] as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure.’” (quoting Santa
Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977))); JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2009) (“Disclosure is the
remedy the Securities Act embraces for this malady. . . . Sunlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants: electric light the most efficient policeman.” (quoting LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1914))).
34. S. REP. NO. 73–729, at 5 (1934) (noting that one of the “principal problems
with which the [Exchange Act] deals” is “the secrecy surrounding the financial
condition of corporations which invite the public to purchase their securities”); see Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728 (noting that a primary purpose of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act was to ensure disclosure to investors); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 32, at 684 (commenting on the importance of disclosure, both at the time of
issuance and at regular intervals thereafter, as a key goal of the Securities Laws).
35. The primary market refers to the sale of securities from an issuer to an investor.
If the sale of securities refers to the first such sale for the company issuing the
securities, then the sale is referred to as an initial public offering or an IPO. See 1
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 2.0, 2.2 (6th ed. 2009).
36. There are various exceptions to the registration process required by the
Securities Act. See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2006) (providing
three exemptions from registration based on the amount of the issuance and the net
worth of the investors); Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2006) (providing
exemption from registration for small offerings, totaling no more than $5 million in the
aggregate, upon the submission of the minimal disclosure requirements of Form 1-A).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f (requiring the filing of a registration statement and payment
of a registration fee); 77g (requiring registration to contain information specified by
section 77aa); 77aa (requiring issuers to disclose various facts regarding the company,
its operations, and control persons). Prior to the passage of the Exchange Act in 1934,
the Federal Trade Commission was the governmental agency charged with regulating
the securities industry. The SEC was created by Section 4 of the Exchange Act, and
has been the primary regulator of the securities industry from 1934 to the present day.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006).
38. The secondary market refers to the sale of securities that have already been
issued. Purchase and sale in the secondary market is referred to as secondary trading.
Secondary trading can take place in a face-to-face transaction or in an impersonal
securities market such as the New York Stock Exchange. See generally COX ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 2–3.
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companies39 to make disclosures at regular intervals following initial
issuance.40 Taken together, these reporting requirements demonstrate
Congress’ unequivocal position that the disclosure of information to the
marketplace best equips investors to make sound, rational investment
decisions.41 As SEC Commissioner Troy A. Paredes recently stated, the
securities laws are principally based on a policy of “transparency,
achieved through disclosure.”42
In addition to various disclosure requirements, Congress included a
number of antifraud provisions in both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act.43 These antifraud provisions give teeth to the Securities
Laws by providing investors with redress44 against companies that fail to
39. Reporting companies include all companies with a class of securities registered
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, all companies that have executed a primary
offering to the public by means of a registration statement as required by 15 U.S.C. §
77f, and any company with 500 or more shareholders and $10 million or more in total
assets. These reporting companies are often referred to as “public companies.” See
COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 7–8.
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m (2006). Secondary trading refers to the purchase and
sale of securities that have already been issued.
41. S. REP. NO. 73–729, at 1–5 (1934).
42. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Keynote Address at the Fordham
University School of Law: A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and
Financial Law (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/
spch102711tap.htm.
43. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (providing for
civil liability in the case of material misrepresentations and/or omissions in registration
statements); § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (providing for civil liability in the form of
excision of the purchase price in the case of the offer or sale of a security by means of a
prospectus or oral statement containing a material misstatement or omission); § 17, 15
U.S.C. § 77q (authorizing SEC enforcement actions for violations of the Securities Act,
including, inter alia, violations of the anti-fraud provisions); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (making it unlawful to use or employ any manipulative
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a security); § 21A, 15
U.S.C. § 77u-1 (providing for civil penalties in instances of insider trading).
44. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing
an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5); see also Superintendent of Ins. Of
the State of New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is
now established that a private right of action is implied under s[ection] 10(b)” of the
Exchange Act.). Additionally, the antifraud provisions create rights of action for
securities regulators – chiefly the SEC and, in the criminal context, the Department of
Justice – as well. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (authorizing
SEC enforcement actions for violations of the Securities Act); § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
(authorizing the SEC to seek injunctions in order to prevent ongoing violations of the
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comply with, inter alia, disclosure requirements.45 Of these antifraud
provisions, the most widely used are Exchange Act section 10(b)46—the
“catchall provision”47—and Rule 10b-5,48 promulgated thereunder,
which provide investors with a private cause of action49 against
companies engaging in manipulative or deceptive practices.50 To
succeed on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a private plaintiff need plead and
prove51: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter;52 (3)
connection with a purchase or sale of a security;53 (4) reliance; (5)
economic loss;54 and (6) loss causation.55
Securities Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (authorizing the
SEC to investigate apparent violations of the Exchange Act and any rules promulgated
thereunder); § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (criminalizing false statements made in periodic
filings required by the Exchange Act).
45. See, e.g., Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 512; Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
47. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is
aptly described as a catchall provision.”).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
49. See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. 512 (holding that there is an implied private cause of
action under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5); see also Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13
n.9 (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under [§] 10(b).”).
50. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
51. This Note frequently uses terms such as “establish,” “demonstrate,” or “plead
and prove.” Unless otherwise specifically indicated, all such arguments refer to
standards that must be met to succeed on the merits, not merely to survive a motion to
dismiss.
52. Scienter is a term borrowed from common law fraud that refers to an
individual’s state of mind. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009); see also
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting the
common law origin of the term scienter as a state of mind requirement). To satisfy the
element of scienter in a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud case, a plaintiff needs to plead and
prove that the individual who has omitted material information or who has made a
material misstatement either intended to do so or should have known that her actions
would result in such materially misleading information reaching the marketplace. It is
important to note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 raised the
pleading standard with respect to, inter alia, scienter in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud
actions by requiring plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (2006). The Supreme Court interpreted this language in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd. to require a complaint to provide an inference of intent that is as
“cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference.” 551 U.S. 308, 314
(2007).
53. The element of connection to a purchase or sale stands for the proposition that
no person may recover damages via Rule 10b-5 without having actually purchased or
sold a security. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745–46
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C. ELEMENTS OF RULE 10b-5 IN AN EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET
1. Materiality
In the context of securities fraud, materiality refers to the objective
import of a particular piece of information from a reasonable investor’s
perspective.56 The Supreme Court first defined the concept of
materiality in the context of an alleged factual omission from proxy
materials in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway.57 In TSC Industries,
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, framed the concept of
materiality in terms of whether there exists “a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by a
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of
information made available.”58 A dozen years later, in the landmark
decision Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,59 the Supreme Court “expressly
adopt[ed] the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 context.”60 A determination of materiality requires a highly

(1975) (“[I]t would be insufficient for a plaintiff to prove that he had failed to purchase
or sell stock by reason of a defendant’s violation of Rule 10b-5.” (citing Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952))); see also HAZEN, supra note 35, §
12.7[3][B]. Accordingly, a complaint alleging that the plaintiff would have purchased
or sold a security but for the defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission will
not survive a motion to dismiss. See Cohen v. Stratosphere Corp., 115 F.3d 695, 702
(9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the dismissal of a 10b-5 claim because the plaintiff lacked
standing due to the lack of a purchase or sale).
54. The element of economic loss stands for the proposition that an investor must
suffer an actual monetary loss in order to bring a securities fraud action that will survive
a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., McFeeley v. Florig, 966 F. Supp. 378, 384 (E.D. Pa.
1997); King v. Sharp, 63 F.R.D. 60, 63–64 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
55. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005)).
56. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
57. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
58. Id. at 449. Justice Stevens did not participate in the disposition of the case.
59. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
60. Id. at 231-32 (1988). It is worth noting that Basic, likely the most important
modern securities fraud case handed down by the Supreme Court, was a plurality
opinion.
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fact-specific inquiry to evaluate the objective import of the particular
statement in the context of all other available information.61
Facially, neither TSC Industries nor Basic requires any inquiry into
market efficiency to determine if a statement or omission is material.62
Rather, each case embraces the disclosure mandates embedded in the
Securities Laws and requires companies to undertake an ex ante analysis
of the import of a piece of information from a reasonable investor’s
perspective.63 Some courts, however, undertake an ex post analysis of
materiality by asking the simpler, empirical question—did the
information in question cause a significant change in the price of the
security?64 As discussed in more detail below,65 this approach runs afoul
in two principal ways. First, it provides courts with the benefit of
hindsight, while affording reporting companies no such luxury.66
Second, it conflates the element of materiality with reliance and loss
causation, rather than analyzing each element of Rule 10b-5
separately.67
2. Reliance
The element of reliance establishes a causal link between the
defendant’s material misstatement and the plaintiff’s decision to buy or
sell.68 The most obvious way to establish reliance is for the plaintiff to
plead and prove that they read the defendant’s material misstatement
61. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (1988) (stating that materiality is “an
inherently fact-specific finding”); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d
628, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (commenting on the “fact-intensive inquiry that accompanies
any analysis of materiality”).
62. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32; TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
63. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231; TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
64. See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Fischel, supra note 3, at 4.
65. See infra notes 200–25 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006);
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2010) (requiring public disclosure of
previously material nonpublic information that has been leaked to a third party without
regard for the effect of the information on the company’s stock price); see also HAZEN,
supra note 38, § 12.19.
67. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 4. But see Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d
165, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 13.5B (3d ed. 1995)) (“The reliance requirement is a corollary of
materiality.”).
68. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Lipton v.
Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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and consequently decided to purchase or sell on the basis of that
incorrect or misleading information.69 Reliance of this type is referred
to as direct reliance.70
In addition to direct reliance, the Supreme Court has adopted two
theories of so-called presumptive reliance.71 In Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States,72 the Supreme Court held that reliance may be
presumed when a defendant omitted a material fact.73 Because it would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to prove that they
relied on the absence of certain information, the Court in Affiliated Ute
held that “[a]ll that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in
the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important” in deciding whether to buy or sell.74
In Basic, the Supreme Court again extended the reliance element of
Rule 10b-5 and held that reliance may be presumed when a plaintiff
purchased or sold a security in an “impersonal, efficient market”
following the misstatement or omission of a material fact.75 Known as
the fraud-on-the-market theory (“FOTM”), the holding in Basic
incorporated the ECMH into Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.76 In so doing,
the Court reasoned that an investor who transacts in a security in an
efficient market does so in reliance on the price of that security, which,
in turn, reflects all available information, including any material
misstatements or omissions, about that security.77
The more foundational question with respect to the FOTM, of
whether the market is efficient, is often dispensed with quickly by the
69. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42; Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61
(3d Cir. 1986); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905–06 (9th Cir. 1975).
70. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61.
71. It should be noted that the circuits are currently split on a third possible
presumption of reliance known as the fraud-created-the-market theory. That theory
presumes that investors rely not on the price of securities but rather on the integrity of
the market itself. See, e.g., Matt Silverman, Note, Fraud Created the Market:
Presuming Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Primary Securities Market Fraud Litigation, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1787 (2011); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise
and Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
359 (1995).
72. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
73. Id. at153–54.
74. Id.
75. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246, 248.
76. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; see also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61.
77. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (citing Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).
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courts.78 In large, liquid trading environments, such as the New York
Stock Exchange, market efficiency is presumed.79 In over-the-counter
markets,80 courts generally consider expert testimony and look to factors
such as (1) weekly trading volume; (2) the number of securities analysts
following the company in question; (3) the number of market makers
with respect to the security in question; (4) the company’s eligibility to
file a Form S-3 Registration Statement;81 and (5) “empirical facts
showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate
events or financial releases and an immediate response in stock price.”82
It is important to note that a defendant may rebut both the Affiliated
Ute and Basic presumptions of reliance by showing that the plaintiff did
not actively rely on the material misstatement or omission.83 As a
practical matter, because the overwhelming majority of securities fraud
class actions settle, and such rebuttal would occur at trial, rebutting an
alleged presumption of reliance hardly ever occurs.84

3. Loss Causation
The element of loss causation refers to “the causal connection
between the material misrepresentation and the loss.”85 In securities
fraud, as in common law fraud,86 it is insufficient to demonstrate mere
78.
79.
80.
81.

Silverman, supra note 71, at 1787.
See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1277 (D.N.J. 1989).
See HAZEN, supra note 35, § 1.1.
COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 184–86 (explaining that form S-3 provides
certain established issuers the opportunity to register classes of securities in a simpler,
streamlined manner by allowing for, inter alia, the integration of previous filings into
an issuer’s registration statement).
82. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87.
83. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153–54 (1972); see also Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets”
Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Act, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 995, 997 (2003); Silverman, supra note 71, at 1800 nn.116–18.
84. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 47 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (“An overwhelming percentage of securities class actions are settled . . . .”)
(citing Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Ten Things We Know and Ten Things
We Don’t Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1015
PLI/Corp. 1015, 1027 (1997)); see also Oldham, supra note 83, at 1005; Silverman,
supra note 71, at 1800 n.117.
85. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
86. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (D.N.J. 1999)
(stating that Rule 10b-5 fraud, “although statutory in origin, sounds in the common law
of fraud and deceit and retains, in modified form, the common law elements of duty,
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correlation between the defendant’s misstatement and the plaintiff’s
economic loss.87 Rather, to avoid Rule 10b-5 from being used as a form
of “investors’ insurance,”88 the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s
material misstatement was in a “reasonably direct, or proximate, way
responsible” for the plaintiff’s economic loss.89 Take, for instance, the
following example. On Monday, ABC Company makes a material
misstatement. On Tuesday, Investor X purchases securities of ABC
Company relying on that material misstatement, either directly or via the
reliance presumptions set forth in Affiliated Ute or Basic. On
Wednesday, ABC Company releases a statement correcting the material
misstatement it made on Monday (referred to as a corrective disclosure).
After the corrective disclosure is released, the price of ABC Company’s
securities declines significantly and Investor X, who sold her securities
thereafter, suffers an economic loss. For Investor X to properly plead
and prove loss causation in this hypothetical situation, she would need to
demonstrate that the fraud, revealed to the market by means of a
corrective disclosure, caused her price of the securities to depreciate
and, therefore, caused their economic loss.90 In the rare instance of trial,
plaintiffs generally attempt to prove loss causation via expert testimony,
in which the plaintiff’s expert presents statistical data, usually in the
form of an event study,91 that seeks to establish a causal link between the
corrective disclosure and the economic loss.92 Generally speaking,
defendants also utilize expert testimony to attempt to rebut or discredit

breach, causation, and damages) (citing Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d
534, 547 (5th Cir. 1981)).
87. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
88. Id. at 345 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 252 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)) (“[A]llowing recovery in the face of affirmative evidence of
nonreliance would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of investor’s
insurance.”).
89. In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 359 (S.D. Fla.
1991); see HAZEN, supra note 35, § 12.11.
90. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
91. An event study is a form of statistical regression analysis that seeks to
determine the causal link between two events. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M.
Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities
Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 195 (2009).
92. See id.
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the evidence presented by the plaintiff’s expert, resulting in a so-called
“battle of the experts.”93
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
It is clear that to succeed on the merits in a Rule 10b-5 claim, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s previous material
misstatements, revealed to the market by means of a corrective
disclosure, caused the plaintiff’s economic loss.94 Since Dura, this has
been established as black-letter law.95 One point that is not clear,
however, is how quickly the price of a security must depreciate after the
release of a corrective disclosure. This question has split those circuits
that have provided an opinion into two camps. The Second, Third, and
Eleventh Circuits require a security to depreciate “immediately”
following the release of a corrective disclosure. Conversely, the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits draw no bright-line rules and engage each case
on its facts. On March 7, 2011, the Supreme Court declined to resolve
this split of authority.96
A. IMMEDIATE DEPRECIATION REQUIRED
The Second Circuit, Third Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit all require
an immediate depreciation in the price of a security following the
release of a corrective disclosure. Absent such a showing, a complaint
alleging Rule 10b-5 securities fraud will not survive a motion to
dismiss.97 Although each case turns on its own facts, it is important to
note that in each case discussed below, the plaintiffs pled reliance based

93. See id.; see also Martis Alex & Michael W. Stocker, Role of the Event Study in
Loss Causation Analysis, 242 N.Y. L.J. 36 (2009).
94. Dura, 544 U.S. at 336.
95. Cf. Find What Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1316–17 (11th
Cir. 2011) (holding that defendants can be liable under Rule 10b-5 for failure to take
affirmative steps to limit the period during which a security is trading at an inflated
price); see also Lyle Roberts, Repeating Falsehoods, THE 10B-5 DAILY (Oct. 7, 2011,
10:10 PM), http://www.the10b-5daily.com/archives/001154.html.
96. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir.
June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
97. See, e.g., In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir.
2010); Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 2010); Oran v.
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).

206

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

on FOTM.98 Accordingly, at the time of transaction, the relevant district
courts presumed that the plaintiffs purchased securities in an efficient
market.
The Third Circuit, in Oran v. Stafford, was the first to consider and
opine on how fast an efficient market incorporates information.99 In
Oran, the plaintiff class alleged that American Home Products Corp.
(“AHP”), a major pharmaceutical company, made material
misstatements and omissions about the safety of two weight-loss
drugs—Pondimin and Redux—that doctors often prescribed in tandem
and colloquially referred to as “fen-phen.”100 According to the plaintiffs
allegations, AHP learned about heart valve abnormalities in fen-phen
patients as early as February 1994 and, although AHP looked into the
matter internally, failed to disclose any such information to its
investors.101 On July 8, 1997, AHP, the Food and Drug Administration
(the “FDA”), and others issued a joint press release that disclosed
reports of heart valve abnormalities in a population of fen-phen patients,
emphasized the seriousness of these reports, and noted that there was no
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between fen-phen and heart
valve abnormalities.102 AHP’s stock price did not decline.103 Two
months later, on September 12, 1997, the FDA showed AHP data
indicating that 92 of 291 fen-phen patients developed heart valve
abnormalities.104 On September 15, 1997, the next business day, AHP
pulled fen-phen from the market and issued a press release projecting
lost profits of $0.14 per share for fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year
98. See, e.g., Complaint, Oran v. Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.N.J. 1999) (No.
97-4513); Complaint at 110, In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 400
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-4483); Thompson, 610 F.3d at 680 (Tjoflat, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“I will read [the plaintiff’s] Rule 10b-5 claim broadly to
invoke the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.”).
99. 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). It is important to note that Oran was decided five
years before Dura—the seminal Supreme Court case regarding loss causation. In this
regard, one could argue that Oran is not relevant to the issue at hand both because it
predates Dura and because it does not comment on the issue of loss causation but rather
engages in a post hoc analysis of materiality. As argued below, the Third Circuit’s
approach in Oran improperly frames the concept of loss causation in the context of
materiality, which should be analyzed separately in the context of Rule 10b-5 litigation.
100. Id. at 279.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 280.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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1998.105 AHP’s stock price dropped 311/16 points, to 73¼.106 The next
day, despite a Wall Street Journal article warning about possible class
action suits, AHP’s stock gained slightly.107 On September 17, 1997,
both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times published articles
indicating that AHP knew of abnormalities since at least March of 1997,
and likely faced substantial liability.108 Subsequently, AHP’s stock price
dropped 41/4 points.109 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging Rule 10b-5
securities fraud.110 The District of New Jersey dismissed the suit,
holding that the July 8, 1997 press release fully disclosed the risks to the
market and, therefore, because there was no appreciable decline in
AHP’s stock price immediately thereafter, the alleged misstatement was
immaterial as a matter of law.111
In an opinion by then-Judge Alito, the Third Circuit affirmed.112
Echoing the views of the District Court, Judge Alito analyzed the issue
not in terms of loss causation, but rather in terms of materiality in an
efficient market.113 Endorsing the ECMH as orthodoxy, Judge Alito
stated that in an efficient market such as the New York Stock Exchange,
where AHP traded its shares, material information is immediately
incorporated into stock prices.114 As such, “when a stock is traded in an
efficient market, the materiality of disclosed information may be
measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s stock.”115
Therefore, because AHP’s stock price did not immediately depreciate
following the July 8, 1997 disclosure—in fact, as then-Judge Alito
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 281.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 281–87.
Id. at 282 (“In Burlington, however, this Court fashioned a special rule for
measuring materiality in the context of an efficient securities market. This rule was
shaped by the basic economic insight that in an open and developed securities market
like the New York Stock Exchange, the price of a company’s stock is determined by all
available information regarding the company and its business. In such an efficient
market, ‘information important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated
into the stock price.’” (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d
1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added))).
115. Id. at 282.
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pointed out, AHP’s share price rose by $3.00 during the four days
following the July 8 press release—the misstatements and omissions
alleged were immaterial as a matter of law.116
A decade after Oran, the Second Circuit took a position in In re
Omnicom Group, Inc. Securities Litigation.117 According to the plaintiff
class, Omnicom Group—a global advertising firm—entered into a
transaction with Pegasus Partners II, L.P.—a private equity firm—in the
first quarter of 2001.118 The entire purpose of the transaction was to
transfer Omnicom Group’s interests in multiple internet companies, the
values of which were depreciating rapidly in the wake of the dotcom
bubble.119 At the time of the transaction, multiple news sources
commented on the transaction and, similar to the plaintiff class,
suggested “that it was an attempt to move the internet companies, whose
value was deteriorating, off Omnicom’s books.”120 In spite of this
coverage, Omnicom Group’s stock did not exhibit a statistically
significant drop in price.121 Over a year later, on June 5, 2002,
Omnicom Group filed a Form 8-K disclosing that an outside director
who sat on the audit committee resigned from the Board.122 Over the
course of the next several days, multiple news sources commented on
the director’s departure.123 On June 12, 2002, the Wall Street Journal
published the most negative article to date, noting disagreement with the
internet companies transaction, aggressive accounting habits, possible
cash flow concerns, an increase in borrowing, and off-balance sheet earn
out obligations.124 Later that day, Omnicom held a conference call
during which it concomitantly tried to reassure its investors, while
admitting that the director in question did resign for the reasons
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 282–83.
597 F.3d 501 (2d Cir. 2010).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505 n.1, 504–05; see also Complaint at 27, In re Omnicom Group, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-4483) (“As a result of the
serious, other than temporary impairment that had been sustained by its e-services
investments, Omnicom was required to write-down these investments in accordance
with GAAP. But rather than taking these write-downs and suffering the inevitable blow
to its earnings that resulted from its losing investments, Omnicom perpetrated a scheme
to move these losses off its books and maintain the façade of continued growth.”).
120. In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 505.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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suggested in the Wall Street Journal article.125 In the two days
following the article, Omnicom’s stock price dropped more than 25%
relative to trading prices and activity in the market and the industry.126
Notwithstanding the steep drop in price, on June 13, 2002, a Lehman
Brothers analyst stated in a report that the previous day’s Wall Street
Journal article “did not bring up any substantial ‘new’ issues.”127
Following extensive discovery, the Southern District of New York
granted Omnicom’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, in light
of the timing of the disclosures relative to the drop in Omnicom Group’s
stock price, there existed no issue of material fact and, accordingly, the
plaintiff could not prove loss causation.128
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.129 Framing the issue in
terms of loss causation, rather than following the Third Circuit’s post
hoc materiality analysis, the Second Circuit stated that the June 6, 2002
Wall Street Journal article did not properly constitute a corrective
disclosure because “a negative journalistic characterization of
previously disclosed facts does not constitute . . . anything but the
journalists’ opinions.”130 Therefore, because the article contained no
new “hard fact[s]” and merely commented on facts that were already
known to the market for over a year, there was no causal connection
between the article and the drop in price.131 Moreover, because the
market was aware of the alleged material misrepresentations for more
than a year and because such “numerous public reports . . . were
‘promptly digested’ by the market,” the plaintiffs’ theory of loss
causation was untenable as a matter of law.132
Strictly interpreted, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Omnicom does
not require an immediate drop in price.133 Rather, Omnicom stands for
the narrow proposition that a plaintiff cannot establish loss causation

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 507.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 505 (“Several news articles at or near the time reported the Seneca
transaction and suggested that it was an attempt to move the internet companies, whose
value was deteriorating off Omnicom’s books. Indeed, observers expressed these views
well into 2002. However, Onmicom’s stock never experienced any statistically
significant drop in value at or near the time of these news reports.”).
129. Id. at 514.
130. Id. at 512.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 513.
133. Id. at 504.
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when a security depreciates over a year after a material misstatement is
made in a market that “promptly digests” such information.134 However,
two years earlier in Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund
v. Bombardier, Inc.,135 the same court, in the context of analyzing
market efficiency at the class certification stage, stated that “[e]vidence
that unexpected corporate events or financial releases cause an
immediate response in the price of a security has been considered . . .
‘the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on
the market theory.’”136 The Teamsters opinion thus made clear that the
Second Circuit treats markets as inherently efficient, and, when read in
conjunction with Omnicom, suggests that corrective disclosures will
result in immediate price depreciation.137 In turn, immediate price
depreciation seems to be required to establish loss causation in a Rule
10b-5 action in the Second Circuit.138
The most ardent judicial supporter of the immediate price drop
requirement is Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit.139 In his partiallyconcurring and partially-dissenting opinion in Thompson v.
RelationServe Media, Inc.,140 Judge Tjoflat141 argued that a plaintiff
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 511.
546 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 207 (quoting Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989)).
Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners’ Petition, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit
Fund of Chi., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2001) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 5172861 at *6 n.5 (“Other
circuits that follow the [immediate price depreciation approach] include the Second
Circuit . . . .”).
138. Recent case law in the Southern District of New York suggests an even more
stringent position with respect to loss causation. See In re China N. E. Petroleum
Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“A plaintiff who
forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective disclosure cannot logically
ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused by the disclosure.”); see also Lyle Roberts,
Around the Web, THE 10b-5 DAILY (Oct. 21, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.the10b5daily.com/archives/2011_10.html.
139. See Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 639–700 (11th Cir.
2010) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. 610 F.3d 628, 689–90 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. It should be noted that this is, at least, Judge Tjoflat’s second major extraopinion comment with respect to market efficiency in the context of Rule 10b-5
litigation. In a widely cited concurrence in Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723
(11th Cir. 1989), Judge Tjoflat argued in favor of an “economic unmarketability”
standard for plaintiffs seeking to plead reliance via the fraud-created-the-market theory.
Id. at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). The commonality between Judge Tjoflat’s opinions
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cannot properly demonstrate loss causation when a corrective disclosure
is made to the market well before the drop in price. Judge Tjoflat,
however, goes a step further and states that such arguments are “legally
frivolous because [they] advance[] an untenable theory of loss
causation.”142 While Judge Tjoflat’s dissent does not carry the force of
law, his argument goes so far as to suggest that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 sanctions are appropriate in cases where a decline in price
does not immediately follow the corrective disclosure.143

B. IMMEDIATE DEPRECIATION NOT REQUIRED
In sharp contrast to the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, the
Ninth Circuit has endorsed a fact-specific rule with respect to loss
causation and does not draw any bright-line rules based on the
ECMH.144 In In re Apollo Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, the plaintiff
class alleged that the for-profit education provider, Apollo Group, made
material misstatements about a Department of Education (“DOE”)
investigation regarding its student recruiting policies which ultimately
resulted in its stock depreciating.145 In August 2003, DOE began
investigating Apollo about potential violations of student recruiting
standards mandated by the Higher Education Act.146 Such violations, if
true, threatened Apollo’s eligibility for Title IV funding.147 On February
5, 2004, DOE provided Apollo with a report indicating that Apollo had
violated applicable student recruiting standards.148 On September 7,
2004, Apollo announced it reached a settlement with DOE for $9.8

in Thompson and Ross seems to be strict adherence to the ECMH, in both the primary
and secondary markets.
142. Id. at 689.
143. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (allowing the court to issue sanctions in cases
where parties offer frivolous arguments).
144. See, e.g., In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008
WL 3072731, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL
5927988 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir.
2009); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir.
2005).
145. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL
3072731, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2008).
146. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *5.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6.
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million.149 Apollo’s stock price did not decline.150 One week thereafter,
no fewer than four widely read newspapers published articles relating to
Apollo’s recruiting practices and the settlement with the DOE.151 Once
again, Apollo’s stock price did not decline.152 On September 20, 2004, a
UBS analyst published a report—containing no new facts—that cast
Apollo in a negative light and downgraded its buy-sell rating from
“Neutral” to “Reduce.”153 The next day, Apollo’s stock price dropped
significantly.154 Following a full trial in the District of Arizona, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff class.155 Thereafter, Apollo
motioned for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the verdict
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).156 Judge Teilborg
granted the motion, holding that the UBS report could not constitute a
corrective disclosure because it disclosed no new facts and, since no
new facts came to the market after the newspaper articles were
published approximately a week beforehand, loss causation could not be
established.157
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit
reversed.158 Citing its previous holding in In re Gilead Sciences
Securities Litigation, the court held that a jury could reasonably
conclude that the UBS report did constitute a corrective disclosure that
149. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 6, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL
4655891, at *7.
150. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 6–7, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL
4655891, at *8.
151. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 7, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL
4655891, at *8.
152. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 8, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL
4655891, at *8.
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011)
(No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *9.
154. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 9, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL
4655891, at *9.
155. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1–2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *2–3.
158. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir.
June 23, 2010).
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provided “additional or more authoritative fraud-related information that
deflated the stock price.”159 In this regard, the UBS report could
constitute a corrective disclosure because, although the market had all
the information contained in the report, the market “failed to appreciate
[the] significance”160 or the “intensity and credibility” of the information
previously disclosed.161
The Fifth Circuit has used a similar fact-specific rule with respect
to loss causation. In Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,162 the plaintiff class
alleged that US Unwired—a digital mobile service provider and an
affiliate of Sprint Wireless—made continuous material misstatements
regarding its short- and medium-term business prospects.163 Allegedly,
US Unwired made positive public representations notwithstanding the
fact that contract obligations with Sprint Wireless, which began in
September of 2000 at the latest, proved to be “disastrous.”164 Although
it did publicly disclose details of contract obligations and corresponding
business plans related to Sprint Wireless, US Unwired “never accurately
disclosed the known risks involved” and continued to tout its ongoing
prospects.165 Finally, on March 5, 2002, US Unwired, in its 10-K filing
with the SEC, disclosed some general risks involved in its obligations to
Sprint Wireless but “did not disclose the potential magnitude of those
risks nor the fact that some of those risks had been realized.”166 All the
while, US Unwired privately pleaded with Sprint Wireless to relieve it
of obligations that left it “reeling from the damage.”167 Finally, between
June 6, 2002 and August 13, 2002, multiple disclosures reached the
US
market regarding US Unwired’s unprofitable obligations.168
Unwired’s stock price plummeted from $4.94 to $0.90.169 The District
Court, although it did not clearly articulate a position regarding an
159.
160.
161.

Id. at *1.
Id. (citing In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Id. at *1 (citing Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir.

1992)).
162. 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009).
163. Id. at 231.
164. Id. at 234.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 236.
168. Id. at 231–32 (noting continuous material misstatements regarding two aspects
of US Unwired’s business: (1) the implementation of a Sprint-backed plan to attract
new “sub-prime” subscribers and (2) the overall character of US Unwired’s business
relationship with Sprint).
169. Id.
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immediacy requirement in the context of loss causation, granted US
Unwired’s motion to dismiss and held, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed
to adequately plead loss causation.170
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that US Unwired’s shares traded
in an efficient market and, therefore, US Unwired’s material
misstatements regarding its business prospects led to an artificially
inflated stock price.171 However, unlike in Oran and Omnicom, the
Court held that “loss causation may be pleaded through a series of
partial disclosures that caused the stock price deflation.”172
Accordingly, from June 6, 2002 to August 8, 2002, the “truth about the
artificial inflation of US Unwired’s stock leaked . . . its way into the
marketplace” and “the final public disclosures completed the revelation
of the truth.”173 Finally, the Court stated:
The market could plausibly have had a delayed reaction; a delayed
reaction can still satisfy the pleading requirements for “loss
causation” though proof of causation would be more difficult when
significant time elapses before the market allegedly reacts . . . . The
actual timing issue is a factual question, and it is not enough to
dismiss a complaint that alleges a specific causal link . . . under Rule
174
12(b)(6).

In no uncertain terms, the Fifth Circuit noted that markets, even
those that traditionally behave efficiently,175 do not always immediately
incorporate news into price, and such a delayed reaction can still satisfy
the loss causation pleading requirement.176
In addition to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit also
does not appear to require an immediate depreciation in price. In City of
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id. at 261 n.31, 266.
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 261 n.31.
Id. at 259, 261.
See id. at 266 n.33 (citation omitted).
The Court in Lormand notes that during the time frame between the material
misstatements and the purchases of shares by the plaintiff class, US Unwired stock
traded in an efficient market. See id. at 259. Although this statement has the potential
to confuse the reader, it is important to keep in mind that the Court’s commentary
regarding market efficiency in this context refers to the reliance stage of a securities
fraud class action. See id. (“[D]efendants’ material omissions . . . caused US Unwired’s
stock prices to artificially inflate.”). The Court’s discussion of loss causation, as noted,
makes clear that markets can plausibly have delayed reactions. Id. at 266 n.33.
176. See id. at 266 n.33, 267–68.
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Monroe Employees Retirement Systems v. Bridgestone Corp.,177 the
Sixth Circuit framed the issue of loss causation in the context of the
ECMH.178 In fact, the Sixth Circuit even quoted the Third Circuit and
stated that “information important to reasonable investors . . . is
immediately incorporated into stock prices.”179 Even so, the Sixth
Circuit “measured the stock price reaction over a six-week period.”180
In this regard, even though the Court’s language implies otherwise, the
fact that it measured damages during a period post-dating the corrective
disclosure strongly suggests that that Sixth Circuit, like the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, favors a fact-specific rule with respect to loss causation.
III. COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LORMAND
In analyzing the question of how quickly the price of an equity
security must depreciate following the release of a corrective disclosure
to the market, courts should look to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in
Lormand and recognize that, even in the context of markets where news
is most often immediately incorporated into price, sometimes markets
for securities behave inefficiently. Adopting such a fact-specific rule (1)
comports with contemporary economic research calling into question the
ECMH; (2) properly and separately analyzes each element of Rule 10b5; and (3) is consistent with other landmark holdings in Rule 10b-5
litigation, all of which have rejected bright-line rules in favor of factspecific inquiries. Finally, such a rule neither extends Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5 beyond their intended purpose, nor is it a form of investors’
insurance.

177.
178.
179.

399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 676 (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1425 (3d Cir. 1997)).
180. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity
& Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *20 (citing
City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d at 651).
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A. CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM OF THE EFFICIENT
CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS
Since Fama’s seminal work in 1970, several scholars and
commentators have called into question the accuracy of the ECMH.181
The scholarship is extensive and challenges the ECMH in many forms:
complex statistical studies identifying persistent pricing anomalies;182
the burgeoning field of behavioral economics, particularly in the context
of noise theory;183 and historical instances of pricing bubbles in 2000
and 2008 which highlight blatant instances of incorrect valuation.184
Even Fama himself, who maintains that the ECMH is the best analytical
tool with which to analyze market movement,185 has stated that the
ECMH “[l]ike all models . . . is a faulty description of price
formation.”186
Notwithstanding vigorous arguments to the contrary, the ECMH
maintains staunch supporters.187 Michael Jensen, who famously referred

181. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 3; Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Ming
Deng, Death of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (20th Australasian Finance & Banking
Conference 2007 Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1006716; William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is
Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV.
393 (1980); Alan Kirman, Economic Theory and the Crisis, VOXEU (Nov. 14, 2009),
http://www.voxeu.org/article/economic-theory-and-crisis; Brian Milner, Sun Finally
Sets on Notion That Markets Are Rational, GLOBE AND MAIL (July 3, 2009, 7:40 PM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/
investment-ideas/sun-finally-sets-on-notion-that-markets-are-rational/article4301916/;
Greg Hoffman, Paul the Octopus Proves Buffett Was Right, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(July 14, 2010), available at http://www.smh.com.au/business/paul-the-octopus-provesbuffett-was-right-20100714-10air.html; Justin Fox, Is the Market Rational? No, Say the
Experts. But Neither Are You – So Don’t Go Thinking You Can Outsmart It, FORTUNE
(Dec. 9, 2002).
182. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 181; Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 181.
183. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 858–89; Stout, supra note 181, at 665–
66.
184. See FOX, supra note 3.
185. Fama, Adjustment of Stock Prices, supra note 20, at 1.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., id.; Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and
Evidence, MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, AT 6, 11; Fama, supra note 3, at 387;
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 858–89.
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to the ECMH as the most empirically evidenced theory in economics,
has reinforced his sweeping comment by stating “there is no better
documented proposition in any of the social sciences.”188 The ECMH
has even garnered general support from Daniel Kanheman, a Nobel
Laureate psychologist whose work has greatly influenced behavioral
economics.189 When recently asked about market efficiency, Kanheman
stated that “[w]hat the market does do very well is that it cancels
random errors.”190
Notwithstanding the fervent debate, the ECMH remains sacrosanct
in the legal context.191 According to Donald Langevoort, the legal
profession behaves as though “economists proved the [ECMH thirty
years ago] and moved on to other topics entirely, so that all that is left is
for the law to come into conformity with this intellectual orthodoxy.”192
While the purpose of this paper is neither to discredit the ECMH nor to
take a side in the debate regarding its accuracy, it does seem counterintuitive for the courts to draw strict categorical rules based on an
unsettled economic theory.193 Any further strict adherence to the ECMH
in an abstract, categorical sense, contributes only to continued willful
blindness on the part of the legal community.194 Accordingly, courts
should recognize, as economists and financial professionals long-since
have, that securities prices sometimes do behave inefficiently195 and, in
such instances, plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove loss
causation over time in an inefficient market.196
188.
189.

Jensen, supra note 192, at 11; see also Langevoort, supra note 4, at 853 n.8.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1175–77 (1997); Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Lowenstein, Ted
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1215 n.14
(2003).
190. Power Lunch: Interview with Daniel Kanheman (CNBC television broadcast
Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000053951.
191. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 855.
192. Id.
193. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989) (“It is not
logical to draw bright-line tests . . . to assist fact finders in determining whether a stock
trades in an ‘open and efficient market.’”).
194. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 854–55.
195. See supra notes 177–182 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008
WL 3072731, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. 2008); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228
(5th Cir. 2009); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651
(6th Cir. 2005).
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B. TEMPORALLY ACCURATE AND INDIVIDUAL
ANALYSIS OF EACH 10b-5 ELEMENT
At least four events must occur in every meritorious Rule 10b-5
claim: (1) ABC Company makes a material misstatement or omission at
time t1; (2) Investor X purchases securities of ABC Company based on
presumed reliance197 on ABC Company’s material misstatement or
omission at time t2; (3) a corrective disclosure is released with respect to
ABC Company’s material misstatement or omission at time t3; and (4)
Investor X sells her ABC Company securities for a loss at time t4.198 Of
course, each of these events occurs at a different point in time under the
condition that t1 < t2 < t3 < t4. Depending upon which part of the country
the Rule 10b-5 complaint is filed, however, this scenario will be
analyzed very differently.199
Within the Third Circuit, the foundational question is whether the
market is efficient.200 Oftentimes, the market will be assumed efficient
because the complaint will plead reliance based on the FOTM and the
defendant will not rebut that presumption.201 Assuming an efficient
market, the only other relevant question is whether the market price of
ABC Company’s securities depreciated immediately following the
release of the corrective disclosure (at time t3).202 If the answer is yes,
then the plaintiff has established materiality and, most likely, loss
197. Reliance could also be pled directly, i.e., Investor X actually read the material
misstatement and decided to purchase based upon, inter alia, such information.
198. In this hypothetical situation, the transaction is structured chronologically as a
purchase and sale. The hypothetical could just as easily be inverted as a sale and
purchase. If the transaction in question involves a short sale, however, loss causation is
a much more complex issue. See Wilamowsky v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.,
No. 10-cv-7471, 2011 WL 4542754 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011); see also Lyle Roberts,
Win Big or Go Home, THE 10B-5 DAILY (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://www.the10b5daily.com/archives/001156.html.
199. Compare In re Omnicom Group Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir.
2010), Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 2010), and
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000), with In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 3072731, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. 2008); Lormand v.
US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v.
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005).
200. See Oran, 226 F.3d 275.
201. See Silverman, supra note 70, at 1798 (commenting on the effective necessity
of presumptive reliance in the context of securities fraud class actions).
202. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 4; see also Oran, 226 F.3d 275, 282; In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).
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causation.203 If the answer is no, then the alleged material misstatement
was immaterial in the first instance and the issue of loss causation is
moot.204
Within the Second and the Eleventh Circuits, the analysis is largely
the same except that the post hoc determination of materiality is
replaced by consideration of the element loss causation.205 Assuming an
efficient market at the time of purchase (at time t2), the only remaining
question is whether the market price of ABC Company’s securities
depreciated immediately following the release of the corrective
disclosure.206 If the answer is yes, then the plaintiff has most likely
established loss causation.207 If the answer is no, then the plaintiff
cannot demonstrate loss causation and the case will likely be
dismissed.208
The common theme running through both these analyses is that
market efficiency is only considered in the context of reliance at the
time of purchase (at time t2) and is not considered in the context of loss
causation at the time of sale (at time t3).209 However unlikely, it is
203. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 275; Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1410; see also
Fischel, supra note 3, at 4.
204. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 282; Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425; see also
Fischel, supra note 3, at 4.
205. See, e.g., In re Omnicom Group Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir.
2010), Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 680, 689 (11th Cir.
2010).
206. See, e.g., Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 680, 689.
207. See, e.g., Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 628.
208. See, e.g., Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 628.
209. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also, Omnicom, 597 F.3d at
510–11 (“With regard to reliance, appellant’s complaint invokes the presumption of
reliance based on the [FOTM] . . . . [It further alleges that] the market for Omnicom’s
securities promptly digested current information regarding Omnicom from all publicly
available sources and reflected such information in Omnicom’s stock price. Having
sought to establish investor reliance by the [FOTM] theory, appellant faces a difficult
task . . . . In short, appellant must concede that the numerous public reports on the
Seneca transaction were ‘promptly digested’ by the market and ‘reflected . . . in
Omnicom’s stock price’ in 2001 while seeking to recover for a stock price decline a
year later in 2002”) (citation omitted); Thompson, 610 F.3d at 691( “[T]he efficient
market theory–on which Jacoby relies–posits that all publicly available information is
reflected in the market price of the security. As of July 14, 2005, the market knew that
Media sold $340,000 worth of stock to five Indiana investors . . . . As of June 16, 2005,
the market knew that Summit could act as a finder and would be paid a seven percent
finder’s fee . . . . And as of March 20, 2006, the market knew that Media paid Summit a
total ‘success fee’ of $28,500 in connection with its private placement of common stock
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possible that the market for a particular security exhibits semi-strong
form characteristics at time t2 but, for any one of a number of reasons
posited by behavioral economists,210 exhibits weak form characteristics
at time t3.211 Notwithstanding this possibility, a complaint alleging such
facts in the Second, Third, and, possibly, Eleventh Circuits would be
more vulnerable to dismissal as a matter of law.212
To avoid such a result, courts should examine each element of Rule
10b-5 securities fraud separately and in chronological order. The first
element to examine is materiality.213 The court must assess whether
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available.”214 Logically absent
from this definition is any mention of market efficiency. Reporting
companies maintain a duty to disclose material information to their
investors regardless of the efficiency characteristics exhibited by the
market for their securities.215 Accordingly, courts, like reporting
companies, should analyze the materiality of information at time t1, the

. . . . Accordingly, the market had absorbed this information well before the May 23
amendment. If not, those shares were not being traded in an ‘impersonal, welldeveloped’ and efficient market, as required for the application of the fraud-on-themarket doctrine”); Oran, 226 F.3d at 282 (“[W]hen a stock is traded in an efficient
market, the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking
to the movement, in the period immediately following the disclosure, of the price of the
firm’s stock. Because in an efficient market ‘the concept of materiality translates into
information that alters the price of the firm’s stock,’ if a company’s disclosure of
information has no effect on stock prices, ‘it follows that the information disclosed . . .
was immaterial as a matter of law.’” (quoting Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425); see also
Fischel, supra note 3, at 4.
210. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 858–89; Stout, supra note 186, at 665–
66.
211. See supra notes 3, 83 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 282; Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1419; Omnicom, 597
F.3d at 512–13; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 689–90 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
213. Given a separate analysis of each element of Rule 10b-5, the element of
materiality logically must be the first inquiry. See generally Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (listing a material misrepresentation as the first
element of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud).
214. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
215. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 230, 239–40, 249 (2012); see also HAZEN, supra note
38, §§ 3.9[8], 12.9[10], 12.19; COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 630–49.
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time when a misstatement or omission is disclosed to the market.216 In
so doing, courts would be faithfully following the rule handed down in
TSC Industries and undertaking the same analysis required of reporting
companies. In adhering to such a rule, certain information that is
correlated to significant price movement at time t3 may be deemed
immaterial at time t1. Such a result is both litigant-neutral and logically
sound. Just as an inefficient market cannot render material information
immaterial, neither can an efficient market render immaterial
information material.
The next step is analyzing reliance.217 Assuming the plaintiff
pleads reliance based on the FOTM, the court should question whether
at the time of purchase (at time t2), the market for ABC Company’s
securities exhibited semi-strong form efficiency characteristics.218 If so,
then reliance has been demonstrated and the analysis should proceed. If
not, then the court need further analyze when the market incorporated
the material misstatement into the price of ABC Company’s securities
(at time t2).219 In the context of a class action, such an analysis will
likely reduce the size of the class because, rather than indiscriminately
beginning the class period at time t2, the class period would begin at the
time that the market for ABC Company’s securities actually
incorporated the misstatement into the price (at time t2’).220 Such an
approach, in addition to being truth-seeking, would provide the courts
with a tool to precisely define plaintiff classes, rather than using an
over-inclusive standard.
Finally, the court must analyze loss causation.221 The operative
question, as outlined in Dura, is whether the revelation of the fraud to

216. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; see also Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §
243.100(a) (2010) (requiring reporting companies to remedy the inadvertent disclosure
of material non-public information by prompt public disclosure); Form 8-K, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
217. The element of “connection to a purchase or sale” is effectively analyzed at this
step as well.
218. A consideration of whether the market exhibited semi-strong market
characteristics is appropriate because, in such markets, the prices of securities reflect all
publicly available information about such securities. See supra notes 10–29 and
accompanying text.
219. This fact pattern assumes that t2 < t2’ < t3.
220. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891 at *31–32.
221. Given a separate analysis of each element of Rule 10b-5, the element of loss
causation logically will be the last inquiry, not including a calculation of damages. See,
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the marketplace caused the relevant economic loss.222 As such, courts
should question whether the market for ABC Company’s securities
exhibited semi-strong form efficiency characteristics at the time of the
corrective disclosure (at time t3).223 If so, then all that remains is for the
court to measure damages based on the depreciation in price of ABC
Company’s securities from time of purchase (at time t2)224 to time of sale
(at time t4).225 If not, then the court need further analyze when the
market began to price the corrective disclosure into ABC Company’s
securities.
The question logically turns to how courts should determine if a
market exhibits semi-strong form characteristics. Perhaps the most
common judicial analytical framework was outlined in Cammer v.
Bloom.226 In Cammer, the Court set out five characteristics common to
an efficient market: (1) weekly trading volume; (2) the number of
securities analysts following the company in question; (3) the number of
market makers with respect to the security in question; (4) the
company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration Statement; and (5)
“empirical facts showing a cause and effect relationship between
unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an immediate
response in stock price.”227 In addition, other courts have considered
factors such as market capitalization; bid-ask spreads on the company’s
securities; the company’s outstanding float; and the percentage of equity
securities owned by company insiders.228 These factors, albeit important

e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (listing loss causation as an
element of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud).
222. Id. at 341–42.
223. See supra note 209–11 and accompanying text.
224. Of course, if the market did not price in the material misstatement at time t2,
then damages should be measured from time t2’, i.e., the time that the market priced in
the material misstatement, to time t4. Such a scenario is reserved for situations in which
the market for ABC Company securities exhibits weak form characteristics at least
between times t1 and t2’.
225. See HAZEN, supra note 38, § 12.12; COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 716–19.
226. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
227. Id. at 1286–87.
228. See In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 (N.D. Ala. 2009)
(citing Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005).
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proxies for market efficiency, should ultimately give way to a battle of
the experts,229 as it beyond the expertise of the courts.230
C. CONSISTENCY WITH LANDMARK RULE 10b-5 CASES
Adopting a fact-specific rule in the context of a non-immediate
price reaction also comports with Supreme Court precedent in the Rule
10b-5 context, which has repeatedly eschewed bright-line rules.231 For
example, in Basic, the Court was asked to hold that preliminary merger
discussions are immaterial as a matter of law and, therefore, do not give
rise to a reporting company’s duty to disclose.232 The Court declined
such a holding and adopted the TSC Industries reasonable investor
test.233
More recently, the Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule on the
issue of materiality in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.234 In
Matrixx, Matrixx Initiatives, a pharmaceutical company, received a
statistically insignificant amount of adverse event reports for its bestselling drug Zicam, which accounted for up to 70% of its sales
revenue.235 The adverse event reports claimed that Zicam caused
anosmia—the loss of the sense of smell—in several patients.236 Matrixx
Initiatives investigated the matter but did not disclose the reports to its
shareholders.237 Once this information made its way to the market,
Matrixx Initiatives’ price fell significantly.238 Matrixx Initiatives argued
that because the number of adverse event reports was statistically
insignificant, the information was immaterial as a matter of law.239 In an
opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court, relying heavily on the
229. See generally Andrew M. Erdlen, Timing Is Everything: Markets, Loss, and
Proof of Causation in Fraud on the Market Actions, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 877 (2011);
but see Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 88, at 196.
230. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 88, at 207–08 (discussing the primacy
of expert testimony to interpret market movements for courts in securities litigation).
231. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309
(2011); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
232. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32.
233. Id.
234. 131 S. Ct. 1321 (2011).
235. Id. at 1313–14.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1315.
238. Id. at 1316.
239. Id. at 1318–19.
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reasoning in Basic, refused to adopt such a bright-line rule and
reasserted the importance of the fact-specific inquiry, noting that “[a]ny
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding . . . must necessarily
be overinclusive or underinclusive.”240
In the context of scienter, the Supreme Court has also adopted a
fact-specific rule. In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,241 the
Court considered the proper standard for pleading with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”).242 In
Tellabs, the respondent argued for dismissal of the complaint because it
did not sufficiently allege that Tellabs’ CEO had a pecuniary motive for
making such misleading statements and, therefore, did not sufficiently
allege scienter.243 In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court, while
acknowledging that motive does factor into the analysis, disagreed and
held that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ within the [PSLRA] . . . an inference
of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must
be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”244 Just as in TSC Industries, Basic, and Matrixx, the
Court rejected a simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive
bright-line rule, in favor of a fact-specific, truth-seeking inquiry.245
Of course, none of these holdings is dispositive on the issue of nonimmediate price depreciation in the context of loss causation. However,
they do demonstrate a clear preference on the part of the Supreme Court
to avoid bright-line rules that are necessarily imprecise and very likely
preclusive of some meritorious claims.246 Accordingly, because the
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 1318 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227–29 (1988)).
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Id. at 313; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-67, § 101(b) 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)
(2006)).
243. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325.
244. Id. at 314.
245. See id. (“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other
sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, in
particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of
which a court may take judicial notice. The inquiry, as several Courts of Appeals have
recognized, is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong
inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation,
meets that standard.”) (internal citations omitted).
246. See supra Part III.C.
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question of how quickly the prices of equity securities incorporate
information into price is an imprecise inquiry, courts should not adopt
any rule that would preclude a plaintiff from succeeding on a Rule 10b-5
claim as a matter of law simply because of a time lag in price
depreciation.247

D. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A BRIGHT-LINE RULE
Critics of the fact-specific rule are likely to argue that such an
approach is an extension of Rule 10b-5 that (1) gives plaintiffs the
benefit of a presumed efficient market at reliance248 and the presumption
of an inefficient market at loss causation;249 (2) raises concerns
regarding class formation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;250
(3) improperly replaces informational efficiency with fundamental value
efficiency;251 and (4) is contrary to Congress’s desire to limit private
securities claims as expressed by the PSLRA.252
The most likely counter-argument to the proposed fact-specific rule
is that it will be overly plaintiff-friendly. In other words, it provides
plaintiffs with the benefit of a presumed efficient market without any of
the logically following disadvantages.253 As counsel for Apollo argued,
“[i]t posits a market that is perfectly efficient, speedy, and omniscient
for the purposes of granting plaintiffs the enormous benefit of the
presumption of reliance on misrepresentations, but horribly inefficient,
sluggish, and doltish in response to corrective disclosures.”254 Even
more forcefully, securities lawyer Tower Snow has, in the context of
Apollo, argued that “[t]he courts can’t rely on the efficient market theory
for the purposes of . . . reliance . . . and then ignore its underpinnings for

247.
248.
249.
250.

Cf. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005).
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 224.
See infra note 253–61 and accompanying text.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891 at *14.
251.
See infra notes 273–82 and accompanying text.
252.
See infra notes 283–86 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part II.A; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v.
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL
4655891, at *5.
254. Id.
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purposes of evaluating loss causation. Either one embraces the theory or
one does not.”255
It is tempting, for purposes of simplicity and judicial economy, to
adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to Rule 10b-5 analysis.256 Daniel
Fischel has argued that in the context of an efficient market, “there is no
need . . . for separate inquiries into materiality, reliance, [loss] causation,
and damages . . . [and the] relevant inquiry in open-market transactions
should be whether the market price was in fact artificially affected by
false information.”257 Companies and investors alike could also benefit
from the degree of market certainty that a symmetrical, litigant-neutral
rule would provide. Given the volatility in today’s markets and the
fragility of the global economy, such an argument in favor of certainty
and stability is all the more enticing.258
These criticisms, however, fail to take an individual, temporally
accurate approach to Rule 10b-5 analyses. The one-size-fits-all
approach would be acceptable if, from the time of misstatement to the
time of sale at an economic loss (i.e., from time t1 to time t4), the market
for the securities in question exhibited semi-strong form characteristics
at all times.259 There is, however, no way to verify semi-strong form
market behavior without an ex post analysis of relevant pricing data.
Semi-strong form behavior should not be assumed.260 Accordingly, to
ensure a result that approaches the true movement of the market and the
reasons behind such movement, courts should examine market

255. Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Tower Snow Comments on the Ninth Circuit’s
Apollo Group Opinion, D&O DIARY (June 28, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2010/06/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-tower-snow-comments-on-the-ninthcircuits-apollo-group-opinion/.
256. See generally Fischel, supra note 3, at 13.
257. Fischel, supra note 3, at 13.
258. As of the date of this writing, the 50 day moving average of the Chicago Board
of Options Exchange Volatility Index, colloquially known as the “VIX” or the “fear
index” is just below 35.00. See (VIX) Volatility (S & P 500), CBOE,
http://www.cboe.com/DelayedQuote/DQBeta.aspx (insert “vix” into Get Quote)
(accessed Nov. 6, 2011); see also Volatility Indexes at CBOE, CBOE (Jan. 2012)
http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/pdf/VolatilityIndexQRG2012-01-30.pdf
(“CBOE
Volatility Index (VIX®), based on S&P 500 Index Options, is considered by many to
be the world’s premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility.”).
259. Cf. Fischel, supra note 3, at 13.
260. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.
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efficiency both at time of purchase (at time t2) and at the time of
corrective disclosure (at time t3).261
A second likely argument against the fact-specific rule approach is
that it creates confusion at the class certification stage in the context of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.262 The most obvious hypothetical
fact pattern in this regard relates to investors who purchase ABC
Company securities after a corrective disclosure is made (i.e., after time
t3) but before the market—in this instance exhibiting weak form market
characteristics—incorporates the information and yields an economic
loss (i.e., before time t4).263 Such investors, if they were permitted to
participate in the plaintiff class, would have free insurance on their
investment because any losses would be recouped in damages.264
Despite being a plaintiff-friendly rule, such an outcome appears at odds
with considerable precedent.265
This argument, while persuasive in the abstract, is overblown.
First, because the vast majority of Rule 10b-5 cases settle, very few
investors would receive full payment in the form of damages.266
Second, regardless of whether the case is disposed of via settlement or
verdict, investors will not recoup their investment in full because legal
fees will temper any settlement or damages.267 In the case of a
contingency fee, the final figure could see a hair cut of up to 40%.268
Third, the fact-specific rule is very unlikely to incentivize opportunistic
investors who are aware of the misstatement but nonetheless purchase
261.
262.
263.

See supra notes 216, 221 and accompanying text.
FED R. CIV. P. 23.
Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *14.
264. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469
n.5 (5th Cir. 1981); Malack v. BDO Seidman LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 752 (3d Cir. 2010).
265. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981);
Malack, 617 F.3d at 752 (3d Cir. 2010).
266. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 47 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (“An overwhelming percentage of securities class actions are settled . . . .”)
(citing Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Ten Things We Know and Ten Things
We Don’t Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1015
PLI/Corp. 1015, 1027 (1997)).
267. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 84 (1990); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron,
489 U.S. 87 (1989).
268. See, e.g., Venegas, 495 U.S. at 84 (discussing contingent fee arrangements in
which the plaintiffs’ lawyers take as much as forty percent of the gross recovery).
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shares expecting either a profit or damages. As an initial matter,
affirmative proof of non-reliance is sufficient to rebut a presumption of
reliance.269 While such rebuttal is very unlikely,270 it is possible and
may well deter certain opportunistic investors. More practically, this
type of litigation-insured investment is unlikely because it assumes a
foolish investment strategy. Such an investor would be betting on the
likelihood of damages in a case that is unlikely to be resolved
expeditiously. Such an investor also would be betting on the ability of
the plaintiff class to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference of scienter. Finally, because the fact-specific rule requires a
more nuanced approach to class formation, the number of investors who
purchased shares following the misstatement, but prior to the price
inflation, who are ineligible to join the class should, in the aggregate,
offset any number of investors who purchase after the corrective
disclosure but before the price depreciation who are eligible to join the
class.271 In other words, excluding investors that purchased ABC
Company securities after time t2 but before time t2’ should offset the
inclusion of investors who purchased ABC Company securities after
time t3 but before time t3’.272
A third likely argument against the fact-specific rule is that it
creates investors’ insurance by substituting information-arbitrage
efficiency (“IA Efficiency”) for fundamental-valuation efficiency (“FV

269. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153–54 (1972); see also Oldham, supra note 83, at 1005; Silverman, supra note
70, at 1800 nn.116–18.
270. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1288 (D.N.J. 1989).
271. Concerns over perverse incentives remain. If the fact-specific rule is adopted,
some investors who simply neglected to research the companies in which they invested
will make up part of the plaintiff class. One could argue that the courts should not
incentivize investors not to perform due diligence with respect to their investments and
thereafter reward them in the form of damages or a settlement. While ultimately the
question of whether the social costs of the fact-specific rule outweigh its benefits is one
of public policy, it is important to note that the Court in Basic made the informed
decision to include such investors in the plaintiff class via the FOTM. See Basic, 485
U.S. at 245–47; but see Malack v. BDO Seidman LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 749–53 (3d Cir.
2010) (rejecting the fraud-created-the-market theory because, inter alia, adopting it
would reward investors who failed to perform due diligence with respect to their
investments).
272. This fact pattern assumes that t3 < t3’.
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Efficiency”).273 The price of a security is IA Efficient if it reflects all
publicly available information with respect to that security.274 In this
respect, a security that is IA Efficient is identical to a security that
exhibits semi-strong market characteristics.275 To be FV Efficient,
however, the price of a security must accurately reflect its true value.276
A staunch defender of the ECMH might argue that a time lag between a
corrective disclosure and price depreciation is demonstrative of the
market’s lack of FV Efficiency but not the market’s lack of IA
Efficiency.277 Accepting such an argument as true, it follows that the
fact-specific rule would allow investors to recover on the basis of a
market’s FV Inefficiency while concomitantly benefiting from the same
market’s IA Efficiency.278
First, it is important to note that, although it has not explicitly
differentiated between IA and FV efficiency, the Supreme Court used
language more commonly attributed to IA Efficiency in Basic.279
Rather, the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have analyzed market
efficiency without specifically referring to either IA or FV efficiency.280
Secondarily, even assuming that Rule 10b-5 fraud claims turn on IA and
not FV Efficiency, it is not possible to determine whether a particular
price depreciation resulted from IA Efficiency or FV Efficiency ex ante
at the motion to dismiss stage.281 Accordingly, the courts should leave
the granular determination of why the price of a security depreciated to
expert witnesses.282

273. See Wang, supra note 186, at 344; see also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital
Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907,
913 (1989).
274. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 186, at 344; Fischel, supra note 283, at 913.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891.
278. Such an argument also fails to take into account that the fact-specific rule, in
the aggregate, pares down the size of plaintiff’s classes at the reliance stage. Moreover,
if markets are FV Inefficient, then it stands to reason that the amount of damages
payable to plaintiff’s classes would be less significant, because the price increase at the
time of the material misstatement (i.e., at time t1) would also be less significant.
279. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 225, 245 (1988).
280. See id. at 245; see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).
281. See generally Fama, supra note 3 (determining market behavior based on an ex
post analysis of relevant market data).
282. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989).
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Finally, opponents are likely to argue that, because determinations
of market efficiency will often require expert testimony, the fact-specific
rule runs contrary to the Congress’s intent in limiting frivolous strike
suits at the motion to dismiss stage as expressed by the PSLRA.283 As
an initial matter, the fact-specific rule recognizes, as did the Court in
Lormand, that “proof of causation would be more difficult when
significant time elapses before the market allegedly reacts.”284 This
built-in, rebuttable presumption of market efficiency ensures, at least in
part, that this approach will not be abused by the plaintiff’s bar.
Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, the element of
scienter protects against unintended consequences.285 Because plaintiffs
need to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, concerns
related to frivolity are superfluous.286
CONCLUSION
Due to economic scholarship calling into question the accuracy of
the ECMH, the practical reality of imprecise market behavior, and the
importance of adopting and maintaining fact-specific, truth-seeking
rules, the courts should follow the Fifth Circuit’s guidance in Lormand
with respect to the question of non-immediate price depreciation in 10b5 litigation. In addition to ensuring that the federal court system will, to
the extent practicable, seek to determine the actual cause of market
movements, the fact-specific rule provides a consistent, litigant-neutral
mechanism to analyze alleged fraud in the securities markets. While the
ECMH may be an effective analytical tool in certain, specific
circumstances, it nevertheless remains a hypothesis and should be
treated as such in the context of Rule 10b-5 litigation. For the courts to
continue to treat the ECMH as economic dogma borders on
irresponsible. This strict adherence to the ECMH is tantamount to

283. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31.
284. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 266 n.33 (5th Cir. 2009).
285. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 308 (2007);
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
286. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 308; Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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“repeating what [was] read in antiquated textbooks,”287 to the detriment
of investors with potentially meritorious claims.

287. Street Signs: Interview with Stephen Roach (CNBC television broadcast Oct.
27, 2011), available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000052760.

